We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic entry game. The …xed cost of entry is private information.
Introduction
In some markets, a …rm's choice of whether to enter a market is the most important choice it faces. Entry might involve a huge sunk investment up front, yielding large pro…ts if the …rm manages to acquire a signi…cant chunk of the market, but yielding large losses if the …rm …nds itself embroiled in close competition.
Consider the market for the next generation of microprocessors. Suppose that a scienti…c breakthrough occurs, making a better technology possible and widely available. However, a multibillion dollar facility must be created to produce the chip, after which chips can be produced at negligible marginal cost. If a …rm is lucky enough to be the monopolist, then it will dominate the industry for several years until the next generation of microprocessor is invented. On the other hand, suppose that duopoly will make it impossible for the …rm to recoup its investment (for example, if the post-entry game is Bertrand competition). We model this entry choice as a dynamic game played between two rivals, each of whom privately observes its cost of entry. Time is broken into discrete rounds, in which …rms who have not yet entered must decide whether to enter or remain out of the market for another round. Specifying a dynamic process is important, because a one-shot game predicts a positive probability that no one enters, even if monopoly is extremely pro…table.
The potential for entry continues if no one enters at their …rst opportunity, so the static formulation ignores an important part of the story. 1 In the unique symmetric equilibrium of our dynamic model, what emerges is an interesting tension between a desire to grab the market aggressively and a desire to feel out one's rival cautiously. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist, but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure, in which both …rms enter in the same round. In equilibrium, a positive interval of entry-cost types enters in each round, if no …rm has entered in a previous round.
This tension between pro…t opportunities and coordination failure inspired a small but valuable literature a few years ago. Dixit and Shapiro (1986) consider a dynamic entry game, where time is broken into discrete rounds. In each round, …rms that have not yet entered the market decide whether to enter, as a function of the number of …rms who can still enter pro…tably. All …rms have the identical, sunk cost of entry. Dixit and Shapiro run simulations to …nd symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. 2 Their justi…cation for focusing on mixed strategies is that it is unclear how …rms coordinate on which …rms should enter in the asymmetric pure- 1 There is a literature analyzing static entry choice, such as whether to join an auction. See, for example, Milgrom (1981), Levin and Smith (1994) , Smith and Levin (2000) , and Harstad (1990) . Reinganum (1981) analyzes the choice of when to adopt a new technology, but where the adoption time is decided ex ante, with perfect commitment. 2 See also Vettas (2000a) for a careful analysis of the "reverse monotonicity" problem in Dixit and Shapiro. It is possible that incumbents are better o¤ when more …rms have entered, because the probability of overshooting, due to miscoordination of mixed-strategy realizations, is lower. strategy equilibria. However, we show in section 5 that the mixed-strategy approach generates implausible predictions when we perturb the model to allow …rms to have di¤erent costs of entry. We show by example that the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria of both the one-shot and the dynamic models of Dixit-Shapiro typically have …rms with higher entry costs mix with a higher probability of entry than those with lower entry costs. On the other hand, one can also perturb Dixit-Shapiro by introducing a small amount of uncertainty about entry costs. For the limiting case of our model in which the support of the entry-cost distribution shrinks to a point, we show that the equilibrium entry probabilities of the symmetric purestrategy equilibrium converges to Dixit-Shapiro's mixed-strategy entry probabilities. Away from the limit, however, …rms with higher entry costs enter weakly later than …rms with lower entry costs. The distinction is that, with mixed strategies, a …rm must make the other …rms indi¤erent between entering and not, while with pure strategies, the marginal …rm must itself be indi¤erent between entering and not. Bolton and Farrell (1990) introduce private information about entry costs, and analyze an example in which costs are either low or high. Their mixed-strategy equilibrium is the "decentralized" market outcome, which is compared to the outcome of a central planner who randomly picks one …rm to enter. Decentralization e¢ciently sorts …rms, so that lower-cost …rms enter, but there may be coordination failure or costly delays.
When the situation is urgent and private information is relatively unimportant, the central planner provides higher welfare by avoiding duplication and delay. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) model the choice of when to introduce a new product, where the cost of adoption declines over time. They …nd that, in equilibrium, rents can be dissipated through preemptive entry. In their "di¤usion" equilibrium, one …rm enters early and the other …rm enters much later, so the probability of coordination failure, in which both …rms preempt simultaneously, is zero. 3 We revisit the topic of dynamic entry because the underlying tension is simple and ‡exible, and more work needs to be done. Bolton and Farrell (1990) observe that the model extends far beyond oligopoly markets. Within an organization, when a manager assigns tasks, duplication and delay is avoided, but allowing individual initiative could allocate tasks to those best able to handle them. This model is bound to be rediscovered in other contexts. Here, we consider a general version of Bolton and Farrell (1990) , with arbitrary continuous distributions of entry-costs. Bolton and Farrell's analysis centers on an example with a two-point distribution where low-cost types enter in round 1. After round 1, a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is selected for the corresponding game of complete information, à la Dixit-Shapiro.
In their equilibrium, only one cost-type can enter in any given round. We consider arbitrary continuous distributions, which restores pure-strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, an interval of cost-types enter in any given round. We characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium, and demonstrate that the coordination failure does not disappear as the time between rounds approaches zero. The sizes of the intervals (of types who enter in any given round) converge to positive limits, rather than shrinking to zero, as the time between rounds approaches zero. Inferences about the rival's entry cost are drawn from the fact that a round has passed, even if the length of time between rounds is small. We show that, as the length of time between rounds approaches zero (and therefore the discount factor between rounds approaches 1), then with probability arbitrarily close to 1, the …rst entry occurs before an arbitrarily short amount of real time has passed. Other comparative-statics results are derived. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) argue that traditional continuous time formulations are not adequate for modeling games of timing. They develop a continuous-time framework with equilibria that are the limits of discrete-time, mixed-strategy equilibria. Our model further illustrates Fudenberg and Tirole's criticism of traditional continuous time formulations, but di¤ers from their model in two important ways. First, in the usual preemption game, there is a tension between the desire to be …rst and the desire to wait until …rst-mover pro…ts are maximized. In our model, …rst-mover pro…ts are maximized by entering in round 1, and the risk of coordination failure induces some …rms to wait beyond the point where …rst-mover pro…ts are maximized. 4 Second, we consider private information with a continuum of types, and consequently, we …nd pure strategy equilibrium (unlike Fudenberg and Tirole's mixed strategy equilibrium).
In our model, the …rms must decide when to make a grab for the monopoly pro…ts; essentially, the game is over when at least one …rm enters. The model can be contrasted with other dynamic models of incomplete information, such as the war of attrition. See Bulow and Klemperer (1999) . In the war of attrition, …rms wait each other out, and incur costs as they wait. This is an exit model, in contrast to our entry model.
Incurring waiting costs is crucial for types to separate themselves in the war of attrition, because otherwise no one would exit. On the other hand, our entry game allows for, but does not require, signi…cant costs of waiting. Since our game is essentially over when the …rst …rm enters, it is a stopping game, similar to the stopping games in the bargaining and public goods literatures. See Cramton (1992) and Bliss and Nalebu¤ (1984) . Bliss and Nalebu¤ (1984) analyze a game in which people wait each other out, until someone gives in and provides the public good. That person enters the activity of providing the public good in some sense, but in so doing, the person exits the con ‡ict. The semantics of what is called "entry" and what is called "exit" are arbitrary. What is important is the nature of the incentives. In the above papers, a …rm prefers to have its rival stop the game. In our paper, a …rm prefers to be the one stopping the game.
In section 2, we set up the model and demonstrate some preliminary results, adapted from Bolton and Farrell (1990) . In section 3, we show the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, and show that the symmetric equilibrium is unique. Higher values of the monopoly revenue or duopoly revenue cause entry to occur earlier.
We also demonstrate that the …rst entry occurs arbitrarily quickly (in real time) as the time between rounds shrinks to zero. In section 4, we discuss the nature of asymmetric equilibria. In Section 5, we consider the "Bertrand" variant of the model, in which only a monopolist receives positive revenue (marginal production cost is zero). However, the entry-cost distribution is general and the number of …rms is arbitrary. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. Several proofs are provided in the appendix.
The model
We consider a market with two potential entrants, where each …rm privately observes a random cost of entry, c i . We assume that c 1 and c 2 are independent and identically distributed, according to the strictly increasing and continuous distribution function F, de…ned over the support, [c; c]. We assume that F is common knowledge. We assume that c¸0 holds and normalize c = 1.
Time is broken into discrete intervals or rounds. We interpret a round to be the length of time that elapses between the moment a …rm decides to enter the market and the moment the entry decision is observed by the …rm's rival. Denote the length of time that elapses between rounds as 4. Before de…ning the game formally, we o¤er the following description of the game played by the two …rms. In each round, …rms who have not yet entered the market observe the history (i.e., whether the rival has entered previously) and decide whether or not to enter. If a …rm never enters the market, its pro…ts are zero. When …rm i enters, it incurs the sunk cost, c i , it receives monopoly revenues during rounds in which its rival has not entered, and it receives duopoly revenues during rounds in which its rival has also entered. We assume that monopoly and duopoly revenues are independent of entry costs, and that marginal production costs are normalized to zero. Our framework includes, as special cases, Cournot competition with symmetric cost functions, Bertrand competition with symmetric cost functions and perfect substitutes, and symmetric Bertrand competition with heterogeneous products. For example, under pure Bertrand competition, duopoly revenues are zero.
Let r > 0 denote the discount rate per unit of time, which we …x throughout. Let the present value of a permanent ‡ow of monopoly revenues be R m , and let the present value of duopoly revenues be R d . We restrict attention to the interesting case in which R m > 1 > R d¸0 holds. 5 Thus, the discount factor between rounds, ± , is given by ± = e ¡r4 : It follows that the revenue received, in round t only, is ± t¡1 (1 ¡ ±)R m for a monopolist and ± t¡1 (1 ¡ ±)R d for a duopolist. Therefore, the pro…ts of a …rm who enters in round t and is a monopolist forever are (R m ¡ c i ) ± t¡1 , and the pro…ts of a …rm who enters in round t and is a duopolist
More formally, we denote the action of …rm i in round t as e once a …rm enters, it must stay in the market. 6 The payo¤s of the round-t stage game are (
if e t = (1; 0), the payo¤s are (0;
if e t = (1; 1), and the payo¤s are (0; 0) if e t = (0; 0). Our solution concept is sequential equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 below shows that in any sequential equilibrium, a …rm never enters if its rival has previously entered, and that all …rms whose entry cost is less than the duopoly revenue will enter in round 1 (higher cost …rms may also choose round 1). Lemma 2 shows that entry decisions can be characterized by increasing sequences, f® Proof. Let (¾ 1 ; ¾ 2 ; ¹ 1 ; ¹ 2 ) be a sequential equilibrium. Suppose that …rm 1 has entry cost less than or equal 5 The case in which R d > 1 holds is not interesting, because then all …rms would enter in round 1. If Rm · 1 holds, we are essentially back to our model if the distribution of costs is truncated at Rm and probabilities renormalized. Of course, …rms with entry costs greater than Rm would never enter. 6 That is, we have ¾ i (c i ; h t¡1 ) = 1 implies ¾ i (c i ; [h t¡1 ; e t ]) = 1 for all c i ; h t¡1 ; and e t . Our symmetric equilibrium remains an equilibrium without this restriction, where …rms could exit and reenter the market. This restriction rules out folk theorem possibilities, such as alternating who is the monopolist. 7 Sequential equilibrium requires speci…cation of …rm i's beliefs, ¹ i , which maps …rm i's information set, [c; 1] £ h, into the set of distribution functions over [c ; 1] .
to the duopoly revenue, c 1 · R d , and consider three possibilities for …rm 2. (1) Given ¾ 2 , if c 2 is such that …rm 2 enters in round 1, …rm 1 receives higher pro…ts by entering in round 1 and receiving duopoly revenues immediately, rather than postponing entry. (2) If c 2 is such that …rm 2 does not enter in round 1 and we have c 2 · R d , then …rm 1 receives higher pro…ts entering in round 1, rather than postponing entry. The reason is that, if …rm 1 enters in round t > 1 and …rm 2 has not yet entered, then sequential rationality requires …rm 2 to enter in round t + 1. Thus, the best possible outcome for …rm 1 in this circumstance would be to enter in round 1, receive monopoly revenues in round 1 followed by duopoly revenues thereafter. (3) If c 2 is such that …rm 2 does not enter in round 1 and has cost, c 2 > R d , then …rm 1 can again do no better than to enter in round 1 and receive monopoly revenues, since sequential rationality requires that …rm 2 remains out of the market. We have shown that …rm 1 is better o¤ entering in round 1 than waiting, independent of beliefs ¹ 1 . Now suppose that, for some history h t , we have e t = (0; 1). From the previous paragraph, it follows that c 1 > R d holds, since …rm 1 did not enter in round 1. Sequential rationality requires that …rm 1 never enter, independent of beliefs ¹ 1 , because entry yields negative pro…ts. A symmetric argument applies to …rm 2.
Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1, …rms only enter after histories equal to the zero vector, h t = 0. Furthermore, beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path are irrelevant for the characterization of equilibrium. To see this, let b t i be the …rst round for which almost all cost-types for …rm i will have entered, conditional on no entry by …rm i's rival.
Without loss of generality, assume b t 1¸b t 2 holds. For t < b t 2 , we observe h t = 0 with positive probability, so conditional probabilities are determined by Bayes' rule. Conditional on no entry before round b t 2 , …rm 1 must assign probability 1 to …rm 2 entering in round b t 2 . Sequential rationality then requires …rm 1 not to enter in round b t 2 (since duopoly is unpro…table). Therefore, …rm 1's beliefs following a deviation by …rm 2 (to enter after round b t 2 ) are irrelevant, since …rm 2 is better o¤ entering in round b t 2 and guaranteeing monopoly revenues. We can thus characterize the equilibrium strategy of …rm i as a mapping from types into the round in which …rm i enters, conditional on its rival not having yet entered.
Lemma 2. Let (¾ 1 ; ¾ 2 ; ¹ 1 ; ¹ 2 ) be a sequential equilibrium. If …rm i enters in round t (conditional on its rival not having entered) when it has cost c i = c 0 , and if …rm i enters in round t+1 (conditional on its rival not having entered) when it has cost c i = c 00 , then c 0 < c 00 holds.
Proof. Let I t´f c : …rm i's rival enters in round t, given c ¡i = c and h t¡1 = 0g, and let ¹ i (I t ) denote …rm i's assessment of the probability that its rival enters in round t, conditional on no entry before round t.
From the fact that …rm i enters in round t rather than t+1 with cost c 0 , we have:
From the fact that …rm i enters in round t+1 rather than t with cost c 00 , we have:
Inequalities (1) and (2) imply:
Since we have 0 < ± < 1 and 0 · ¹ i (I t ) · 1, the term in brackets in (3) is positive. Thus, we have c 0 · c 00 , but since we restrict attention to pure strategies, a …rm with a given entry cost (c 0 = c 00 ) cannot enter in both rounds t and t+1, so we have c 0 < c 00 . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 is a modi…cation of Bolton and Farrell (1990, Proposition 1), allowing for positive duopoly revenues and focusing on pure-strategy equilibrium. It shows that, without loss of generality, a sequential equilibrium can be charaterized by nondecreasing sequences, f® , then …rm i is indi¤erent between entering in round t and entering in round t+1 (unless its rival enters in round t, in which case …rm i does not enter). 8 In section 3, we restrict attention to the symmetric equilibrium, in which ®
Then in section 4, we consider the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. 8 Because the distribution of entry costs is nonatomic, it does not matter for our characterization of equilibrium whether or not …rm i enters in round t or t+1 when c i = ® t i .
The symmetric equilibrium
We now characterize the symmetric equilibrium entry intervals, f® t g 1 t=1 . A necessary condition is that a "marginal" …rm with entry cost, c i = ® t , should be indi¤erent between entering in round t and waiting until round t + 1. Intuitively, the tradeo¤s are as follows. By entering in round t, …rm i receives duopoly revenues if its rival enters in round t, while it receives monopoly revenues if its rival plans to enter in round t + 1 or later (because the rival will observe …rm i's entry and stay out). On the other hand, by waiting until round t + 1, …rm i receives zero revenue but avoids incurring entry costs if its rival enters in round t (because …rm i will not enter), while it receives duopoly revenues if its rival enters in round t + 1, and monopoly revenues if its rival plans to enter later. Also, the revenue ‡ow associated with monopoly or duopoly is discounted. This allows us to derive a di¤erence equation whose solution gives us f® t g 1 t=1 : Conditional on no entry before round t, a …rm with cost, c i = ® t , that enters in round t receives expected pro…ts of
If the …rm waits until round t+1, and enters if its rival has not yet entered, its expected pro…ts (conditional on no entry before round t) are given by
For t = 0, 1, ..., let F (® t ) be denoted by F t : Equating (4) and (5), and simplifying, yields the di¤erence
Equation (6) is a second order di¤erence equation. The sequence f® t g 1 t=1 must be strictly increasing whenever we have ® t < 1. Otherwise there is a round in which no one enters, but then a …rm who has not yet entered is not behaving optimally. The …rm could instead enter, knowing that its rival would not enter, either simultaneously or afterwards. Entering would yield higher pro…ts, because monopoly revenue exceeds the highest entry cost, R m > 1. We cannot have ® t = 1 for …nite t, because then there is a round in which both …rms are sure to enter (if there has been no entry previously), but duopoly cannot be pro…table for a …rm that does not enter in round 1. There are two boundary conditions. The …rst condition is ® 0 = c.
The second condition is lim t!1 ® t = 1. The second condition follows from the fact that the sequence is increasing and must converge; if the limit is not 1, then eventually a …rm who has not yet entered would be guaranteed to be a monopolist and should enter.
Proposition 1.
A symmetric equilibrium exists, satisfying (6) and the boundary conditions ® 0 = c and
Moreover, the symmetric equilibrium is unique and ® t varies continuously with R m ; R d , and ± for each t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This second order di¤erence equation de…es analytical solution. Proposition 1 is proven by transforming the problem into a two-dimensional dynamical system, and using a contraction argument to show uniqueness. 9 Because the system is well-behaved, we can numerically solve for the equilibrium when the parameters are speci…ed.
Proposition 2 shows that the market settles into its …nal con…guration (either monopoly or duopoly) faster when monopoly revenues or duopoly revenues are higher. Our next result demonstrates, for the class of generalized uniform distribution functions over [0,1], F (®) = (®)¸, that the …rms are more willing to risk duopoly in round 1 when¸is lower. Lower¸corresponds to lower costs, in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance. The lower tail of the entry-cost distribution is denser. Lower¸also leads to lower values of ® 1 , so the interval of entry-cost types choosing round 1 is narrower. The net e¤ect is that the probability of entry in round 1 is unambiguously higher.
Proposition 3. Let F (®) = (®)¸, where¸> 0 holds. Holding other parameters constant,¸>¸implies that the corresponding equilibria satisfy
Propositions 2 and 3 allow us to characterize the e¤ect of R m , R d , and (for generalized uniform distributions)¸on the probability of duopoly in round 1. Higher R m or R d causes …rms to be more aggressive, and lower¸causes …rms to be more aggressive, since costs are lower, according to …rst-order stochastic dominance. We do not have comparative-statics results about the probability of duopoly over all rounds, but simulations indicate that the impact on round 1 tends to dominate.
Corollary. (Of Propositions 2 and 3)
Holding other parameters constant, R m > R m implies that for the corresponding equilibria, the probability of duopoly in round 1 is higher when we have R m . Similarly,
implies that the probability of duopoly in round 1 is higher when we have
where¸> 0 holds. Holding other parameters constant,¸>¸implies that for the corresponding equilibria, the probability of duopoly in round 1 is lower when we have¸.
Proposition 4 below draws a striking conclusion from the fact that ® t varies continuously with ±. As ± approaches 1, each ® t converges, so the probability of either …rm entering in any given round t also converges.
For example, the …rst round, t*, for which entry will have occurred with probability .999 converges as well.
Letting the time between rounds approach zero, it follows that ± is approaching 1 and the length of time before round t* is approaching zero. In other words, as the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the action occurs within an arbitrarily small amount of time. given by t ¤ (º) = T=4 º . Then, as º ! 1, we have: 4 º ! 0; ± ! 1; and t ¤ (º) ! 1. The probability of entry before time T is the probability of entry through round t ¤ (º), given by the expression
Suppose that
2 does not converge to 1 as º ! 1. Then there is a subsequence of equilibria, f®
. Now consider the case in which ± = 1 holds. The proof of Proposition 1 also implies the existence of a solution to (6) when we have ± = 1, which we denote by f® t g. It follows that there exists t
for all t¸t ¤¤ . 12 By continuity, there exists º such that º > º implies
Since in the limit, when we have ± = 1, entry occurs before any real time has passed, it is interesting to compare the properties of our equilibrium with the symmetric equilibrium of the static game, where …rms have only one opportunity to enter the market, and the …rms decide simultaneously. 13 Symmetric equilibrium in the static game is characterized by a scalar, ®, where …rms with entry cost less than or equal to ® enter the market, and …rms with higher entry cost stay out. While in the dynamic model, the cuto¤ …rm's pro…ts must equal the pro…ts from waiting, in the static model, the cuto¤ …rm's pro…ts must equal zero, yielding
11 Assuming that T=4º is an integer is merely a matter of convenience, to avoid cluttering the notation of the proof. 12 The only di¢culty would arise if the convergence of F (® t ) to 1 became in…nitely slow when we have ± = 1. However, the stable manifold de…ned in the proof of Proposition 1 has slope less than (1 ¡ R d )=(Rm ¡ R d ), which is strictly below 1.
13 See our working paper, Levin and Peck (2002) , for some comparative statics results for the one-round game.
We now show that, for given parameters, ® ¤ > ® 1 , so the probability of entry in round 1 is greater for the static model than the dynamic model. The intuition is that the opportunity cost of entry is zero in the static model, while the opportunity cost of entry is the (positive) continuation pro…ts in the dynamic model.
Of course, the probability of eventual entry in the dynamic model is 1, which must exceed F (® ¤ ).
Proposition 5. For given parameters, the probability of entry in round 1 is greater for the static model than for the dynamic model. That is, we have ® ¤ > ® 1 .
Proof. We determine ® 1 by equating the pro…ts of entering in round 1, given by expression (4), to the pro…ts of entering in round 2 (if the rival does not enter in round 1), given by expression (5). In equilibrium, expression (5) must be positive, because …rms with entry costs higher than ® 1 are willing to enter. By letting t=1 hold in expression (4), it follows that, for some K > 0, ® 1 must solve
Treating ® 1 as an implicit function of K, we can calculate
Since ® ¤ solves equation (8) with K = 0, we conclude from (9) that
Let us interpret the time between rounds as the gap between the time a …rm commits to enter and the time the entry decision is communicated to or learned by the rival. Then even when entry decisions can be made and communicated quickly, relative to the lifetime of the market, it is important to view the competition as dynamic. In equilibrium, there is a ‡urry of decision making, where the rival …rms feel each other out, hesitating for fear that both …rms might commit to enter at the same time. Eventually, one or both of the …rms will reach a "comfort level" in which the lower chance of duopoly later is outweighed by the opportunity now. What is important is not the passage of real time, but the passage of decision-making rounds, since inferences are made about the rival's cost and probability of entry. Taking the limit, as time intervals become shorter, maintains a rich dynamic process to determine which …rm or …rms enter. This gives a di¤erent, and more appropriate, description of behavior than the static case.
In this section, we consider the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. We begin by looking for interior equilibria, charaterized by strictly increasing sequences, f® t 1 g and f® t 2 g. Below, we motivate the conjecture that the only interior equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium characterized in section 3, so there are no interior asymmetric equilibria. Consider the decision of …rm 1 in round t. For the marginal …rm with entry cost
, the expected pro…ts from entering in round t should equal the expected pro…ts of waiting to enter in round t+1 (if …rm 2 does not enter in round t). The pro…ts of entering in round t are given by the expression
The pro…ts of waiting until round t+1 are given by
Equating expressions (10) and ( Proof. Suppose instead that lim t!1 ® t 2 < 1 holds. Then there is a t such that, conditional on no entry before round t, the probability of …rm 2 entering in round t is arbitrarily small. Therefore, …rm 1's conditional expected pro…ts are arbitrarily close to R m ¡ c 1 . However, since f® t 1 g is a strictly increasing sequence, some types of …rm 1 enter after round t + ¿ , for any ¿ > 0. These …rms receive pro…ts, conditional on no entry before round t, less than (R m ¡ c 1 )(±) ¿ . For su¢ciently large ¿ , pro…ts would be higher by entering in round t, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Extension to n …rms
The techniques used to analyze the duopoly model can be applied to the model with an arbitrary number of …rms, n. In fact, a stronger characterization is possible when the number of potential entrants approaches in…nity. We assume throughout this section that we are in the Bertrand variant of the model, where revenue is zero whenever more than one …rm is active. Actually, the same analysis goes through if revenue is positive when more than one …rm is active, as long as the revenue is independent of the number of active …rms. We cannot solve the general oligopoly case, because a …rm may consider entering after it sees that some rivals have entered, forcing us to consider many continuation paths of the game. With our "Bertrand" assumption, the game is essentially over after the …rst entry. We …rst derive the di¤erence equation that detemines the intervals of entry-cost types who enter in each round, conditional on no previous entry. Next, we show the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, and provide a complete characterization when the number of …rms is large. We then address the robustness of Dixit-Shapiro to heterogeneity, by looking at two types of perturbations. Finally, we discuss extending our model to allow …rms to avoid some of their entry costs by suspending activity.
Conditional on no entry before round t, the highest entry-cost type who enters in round t, ® t , receives
If this …rm waits until round t + 1, and enters if none of its rivals have entered, its expected pro…ts (conditional on no entry before round t) are given by
Equating expressions (12) and (13), and simplifying, yields the di¤erence equation
To simplify further, de…ne G(® t ) as follows
The economic interpretation of G(® t ) is the unconditional probability that all n ¡ 1 of a …rm's rivals remain out of the market through round t. Then we can rewrite (14) as
Proposition 6. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, satisfying (16) for all t, and the boundary conditions ® 0 = c and lim t!1 ® t = 1.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows the same technique used to prove Proposition 1. We omit the straightforward derivation of comparative statics results analogous to Propositions 2-4. From (16), we can derive a closed-form expression for the limiting equilibrium, as n ! 1.
Proposition 7.
Taking the limit of symmetric equilibria, as n ! 1, we have for each t,
The limiting probability of monopoly is
If we have c = 0, then the limiting probability of monopoly is zero, so the probability of some coordination failure is one.
Proof. Let t be the …rst round for which we do not have lim n!1 ® t = c: Thus, we have lim n!1 ® ¿ = c for ¿ = 1; :::; t ¡ 1, and lim n!1 ® t > c. Then conditional on no entry until round t, the probability of having no rival enter in round t approaches zero as n ! 1. Thus, expected revenues approach zero, but …rms entering in round t incur strictly positive cost of entry. For the marginal …rm, expected pro…ts from entering in round t must be negative for large enough n, a contradiction. We conclude that, for any …xed t, we have
From (16) and (18), we can characterize the limiting di¤erence equation (as n ! 1) as
From the boundary conditions, G(® 0 ) = 1 and lim t!1 G(® t ) = 0, the solution to (19) is given by (17) .
The probability of monopoly originating in round t is G( (15) and (17), we have, for large n,
The limiting probability of monopoly originating in round t is therefore
From (20), the limiting probability of monopoly in any round is the sum of the geometric series,
From (21), we see that the probability of monopoly is zero if c = 0 holds. Q.E.D.
We now compare our model to the analogous version of Dixit-Shapiro. The maximum number of …rms that the industry can accomodate is one (in their notation, M = 1), and exit is not allowed. Our purpose is to show that Dixit-Shapiro is best understood as the limiting case of our model, as the support for the entry cost distribution shrinks. We …rst show that the mixed-strategy equilibrium in Dixit-Shapiro yields perverse predictions when the model is perturbed to allow observable but heterogeneous costs. Firms with higher entry cost mix with a higher probability of entry than …rms with lower entry cost. As a result, …rms with higher entry cost are more likely to enter. Next, we show that, for the limiting symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of our model as c ! 1, the probability of entry in any round converges to the probability of entry in the Dixit-Shapiro mixed-strategy equilibrium. In these pure-strategy equilibria, however, …rms with higher entry costs always enter with (weakly) lower probability. Thus, the "right" generalization of Dixit-Shapiro is to introduce heterogeneity with uncertainty and private information, and to consider pure-strategy equilibria.
The intuition is that a …rm's mixing probability in Dixit-Shapiro makes the other entrants indi¤erent between entering an not, while in our model the marginal type (which determines the entry probability) must itself be indi¤erent between entering and not.
Consider the game with n …rms, where …rm 1 is known to have an entry cost of b c, and …rms 2 through n are known to have an entry cost of 1. Monopoly revenue is R m > 1, and revenue is zero if more than one …rm enters. This is the Dixit-Shapiro model with deterministic heterogeneity added. Since no …rm will enter after at least one …rm enters, we will solve for the type-symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium characterized by the probability that each type of …rm enters in any round, conditional on no previous entry. Denote the (conditional) probability that …rm 1 enters as b q, and denote the (conditional) probability that …rm i enters (for i = 2; :::; n) as q.
Proposition 8. If we have b c < 1, then b q < q holds, and if we have b c > 1, then b q > q holds. In both cases, the …rm or …rms with the higher entry costs enter with higher probability.
Proof. Because of the stationarity of the environment, and the requirement for mixed-strategy equilibrium that a …rm is indi¤erent between entering and waiting, it follows that all …rms receive expected pro…ts of zero in equilibrium. Therefore, we have
Solving (22) and (23), we have
Rearranging (24) and (25) and simplifying, we have
from which the result follows. Q.E.D.
Notice that, because the continuation payo¤ is zero in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the same entry probabilities constitute a mixed-strategy equilibrium to the static game. The perverse result, that …rms with higher entry costs enter with higher probability, therefore holds in the static game as well. 16 Now we return to the model with privately observed entry costs, but consider the case in which c ! 1.
This can be interpreted as a perturbation of Dixit-Shapiro to introduce a small amount of uncertainty about entry costs. Proposition 9. In the limit, as c ! 1, the probability of entry in any round converges to the probability of entry in the Dixit-Shapiro mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. It is clear that, for c su¢ciently close to 1, each ® t must be within a small neighborhood of 1, so the di¤erence equation characterizing equilibrium, (16), becomes
Equation (26), along with the boundary conditions, G(® 0 ) = 1 and lim t!1 G(® t ) = 0, has the closed-form solution,
From (27) and (15), we have
Based on (28), we can write the probability of a …rm entering in round t, conditional on no entry before round t, as
The right-hand expression in (29) is easily seen to be the probability of entry in the Dixit-Shapiro mixedstrategy equilibrium for the corresponding game with known entry cost equal to 1. Q.E.D.
Cabral (1993) extends Dixit-Shapiro, by allowing a …rm's payo¤ to increase with the number of rounds in which it has been active. Experience advantages considerably change the nature of equilibrium when exit is taken into account. The game can alternate between a "grab the dollar" regime, which occurs when the market can pro…tably accomodate more …rms, and a "war of attrition" regime, which occurs when the least experienced …rms cannot pro…tably remain in the market.
A similar phenomenon can arise in our framework. Suppose that when …rm i enters, it incurs an entry cost, c i =T , for each of the …rst T rounds that it is active. Think of the …rm as having the ability to halt construction and save part of its entry costs. Now the equilibrium will have the following properties. There continues to be a sequence de…ning the cuto¤ types who enter in each round, conditional on no previous entry, f® t g . 18 Of course simultaneous resumption of activity leads to another war of attrition, and so on. 19 
Concluding remarks
A subject for future research is to introduce many potential entrants, where there is room for several …rms to be pro…table, more in line with Dixit-Shapiro. Then there must be a positive probability that so many …rms will enter in round 1 as to make the market unpro…table for those who do not enter. However, unlike
Dixit-Shapiro, the number of …rms that the market can support depends on the realization of entry costs, so …rms learn over time whether entry is viable for them. The number of entrants in a given round causes the interval of entrants for the next round to ‡uctuate. We conjecture that there are two e¤ects determining the decision to enter, similar to, but not quite the same as, those in Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . Any new entry in round t means that the market is closer to being "full," so this e¤ect would tend to shrink the interval of types who enter in round t+1. On the other hand, the number of …rms who enter in round t can be greater than expected or less than expected. If few …rms enter in round t, …rms update their beliefs 17 When we have n > 2, then ® t ¿ depends on the history of how many …rms become inactive in which rounds, which enormously complicates computing the equilibrium. Also, depending on parameter values, it is possible to have a corner solution in which any …rm active for ¿ rounds remains active for all T rounds and beyond. 18 Remaining entry costs are in the interval [
, and these costs are incurred over T ¡ ¿ rounds. 19 Moving beyond this qualitative characterization is extremely di¢cult, even for the case, n = 2. For starters, there are many, many "grab the dollar" and "war of attrition" games to be solved, based on how many rounds …rms have been active and the current interval of entry-cost types. Moreover, the fact that di¤erence equation (6) has no closed form solution when T = 1 implies the analog of equation (6) cannot even be speci…ed when T > 1. For example, the expected revenue received when two …rms simultaneously enter, which is zero when T = 1 (since R d is set to 0), is the solution to a war of attrition game for which there may be no closed form solution when T > 1.
about where their entry costs rank among those who have not yet entered, and this e¤ect would encourage entry in round t+1. If many …rms enter in round t, then both e¤ects would discourage entry. Bolton and Farrell (1990) perform a welfare analysis, where gross social bene…ts of entry are assumed to depend on whether entry occurs, but not the number of entrants. For the example they study, in which costs are either high or low, an explicit expression for welfare is derived. The outcome of this "decentralized" game is compared to random assignment by a central planner. For some parameter values, welfare is higher under the central planner. The advantage of the planner is that decisions can be made quickly and in a coordinated fashion. The advantage of the decentralized mechanism is that market incentives select the lower-cost entrant. Bolton and Farrell's application of the model to the famous Lange-Lerner-Hayek debate, on decentralized vs. centralized systems, is brilliant. We merely add that the comparison extends beyond their example. Once the parameters and cost distribution are speci…ed, and the equilibrium is computed by solving the dynamical system numerically, it is a simple matter to compute welfare under decentralization and centralization. For the examples presented in Tables 1 and 2 of Levin and Peck (2002) , the central planner outperforms the decentralized competition. It would be interesting to perform such a welfare comparison after separately specifying consumer surplus associated with monopoly and duopoly. That is, suppose that the planner can choose which …rms enter but cannot a¤ect the post-entry competition. Since duopoly is a coordination failure for the …rms but bene…cial to consumers, it is possible that there is too little entry under decentralization.
Appendix
This Appendix contains proofs omitted from the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the dynamical system in < 2 , where the coordinates are denoted by (x; y).
Then from equation (6), the transition of the system is given by
where g(x; y) is given by the expression
The boundary condition we require is ® 0 = c, and the terminal condition is lim t!1 ® t = 1. We will
show that there is a stable manifold of the system converging to (1, 1) , so that the terminal condition can be satis…ed. Evaluated at (1,1), we can compute
which yields the Jacobian matrix,
This matrix has eigenvalues, 1 ± and
. Because one eigenvalue is greater than 1 and the other eigenvalue is between zero and one, this establishes that the system has a stable manifold such that, if we start on the manifold, we converge to the steady state (1, 1) . See, for example, Stokey and Lucas (1989) .
We now show that there is some value of ® 1 such that (0; F (® 1 )) is on the stable manifold. Looking at the backward dynamics, we can always solve for F t¡1 , given F t and F t+1 , so the manifold must either: cross the y-axis between 0 and 1, cross the line segment between (0,1) and (1,1), or cross the line segment between (0,0) and (1, 1) . (See Figure 1. ) From equation (6), we can derive an expression for the slope of the segment connecting two consecutive points,
First, we show that the stable manifold cannot cross the line segment between (0,1) and (1, 1) . Suppose that we have F t¡1 < 1 and F t = ® t = 1. Then it follows from (30) that we have Second, we show that the stable manifold cannot cross the line segment between (0,0) and (1,1). If ± = 1 holds, then any point on the line x=y is a …xed point, so it cannot be on the manifold converging to (1,1). If we have ± < 1, then any point on the line x=y implies g(x; y) = ¡1, contradicting the fact that (y; g(x; y)) must be on the stable manifold. 21 The only remaining possibility is that the stable manifold crosses the y-axis at some point, (0; F (® 1 )). This establishes existence of equilibrium.
To show uniqueness, we will show that the stable manifold, denoted as y = H(x), is strictly monotonic.
It follows that we can rewrite equation (6) as
Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to x and solving implicitly for H 0 (x), we have
We will use a contraction argument, showing that whenever H 0 (H(x)) is bounded between two constants, then H 0 (x) is bounded between the same two constants. Therefore, we suppose that 0 < H 0 (H(x)) < 1=±
holds. The denominator in (33) is positive for all values of H 0 (H(x)) between 0 and 1=±, and the numerator is positive since we can restrict attention to ® t > R d . This establishes that H 0 (x) > 0 holds. Since the 20 Of course, F t+1 > 1 does not make sense from our knowledge that F t+1 represents a distribution function, but we must show that the di¤erence equation yields a sensible solution. 21 The economic intuition behind a negative slope is that, when ± < 1 holds, starting at a point (x,y) too close to the 45 degree line will cause a …rm to strictly prefer to enter in round t rather than round t+1. The …rm would rather risk the slight chance of duopoly in round t, rather than wait for the discounted ‡ow of monopoly pro…ts one round later. Thus, equation (6) is inconsistent with F t+1¸Ft . denominator in (33) is decreasing in H 0 (H(x)), we have
We know that 0 < H 0 (x) < 1=± holds in the neighborhood of the steady state, so it must hold everywhere. Because H is monotonic, the stable manifold can intersect the y-axis only once, so there is a unique equilibrium.
To show that each ® t varies continuously with the parameters, we show that the stable manifold varies continuously with the parameters. This is accomplished by …rst showing continuity within a neighborhood of (1,1) and then showing continuity outside the neighborhood. Let r denote the parameter in question, either R m , R d , or ±, and let the stable manifold as a function of r be denoted by y = H(x; r).
Since H(x; r) is tangent to the stable eigenvector at x = 1, and the eigenvalues are continuous in r, it
follows that H(x; r) is continuous in (x; r) for some neighborhood of the steady state. Speci…cally, for all " 0 > 0; there exists°> 0 and ½ > 0 such that 22 1 ¡°· x 1 · 1; 1 ¡°· x 2 · 1; and j r 1 ¡ r 2 j< ½ implies
Let ¡(x; y; r) = (y; g(x; y; r)) hold, and let ¡ N (x; y; r) denote the N-fold composition of ¡ with itself, representing the forward dynamics of the system. From equation (6), we can construct the mapping corresponding to the backwards iterate, Q(x; y; r) = (Ã(x; y; r); x), where we have
Let Q N (x; y; r) denote the N-fold composition of Q with itself, representing the backward dynamics of the system. Since Ã is continuous, it follows that Q is continuous, which implies that Q N (x; y; r) is continuous.
For all r 1 and°0 > 0, there must exist N such that ¡ N (0; H(0; r 1 ); r 1 )´(x 1 ; y 1 ) is contained in the ball 22 To be precise,°and ½ must be independent of r 1 and r 2 : This is not a problem, because we can restrict parameters (in particular, Rm) to lie in a compact set. of radius°0 around (1; 1).
23 Fix " 0 in (35), and consider r 2 such that j r 1 ¡ r 2 j< ½. For su¢ciently small°0
, 1 ¡°· x 1 · 1 must hold. It follows from (35) that j H(x 1 ; r 1 ) ¡ H(x 1 ; r 2 ) j< " 0 holds. By continuity of Q N , for all " > 0; there exists " 0 > 0 such that
Since the slope of H(x 1 ; r 2 ) is bounded below 1=±, it follows that we have
Since H(0; r 1 ) is ® 1 when the parameter is r 1 and H(0; r 2 ) is ® 1 when the parameter is r 2 , this establishes the continuity of ® 1 , from which the continuity of ® t , t > 1, follows trivially. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (30) can be rewritten as follows:
We start with R m > R m , and …rst show that ® 1 > ® 1 holds. Suppose instead that we have
Depending on whether we are looking at the economy with parameter R m or R m , we introduce the following notation:
, and 0 · E 1 < E 1 .
In order for equation (38) to hold for both economies (with parameters R m or R m ), this implies
Since F 1 · F 1 holds, F 2 < F 2 and ® 2 < ® 2 must hold as well. Thus, we can show that B 2 < B 2 , C 2 < C 2 , and D 2 < D 2 . Therefore, we have
Rearranging inequalities (40) and (41), and proceeding inductively, we have, for all t,
However, (42) contradicts the fact that, in equilibrium, lim t!1 F t = 1 and lim t!1 F t = 1. We conclude that ® 1 > ® 1 holds.
Next, we show that ® t > ® t holds for all t. Suppose not, and let ¿ be the …rst round for which the reverse inequality holds, ® ¿ · ® ¿ : Thus, we have F ¿ · F ¿ and F t > F t for all t < ¿:
From (43), we can show
Thus, we know that we have B ¿ · B ¿ , 0 · C ¿ < C ¿ , D ¿ < D ¿ , and E ¿ < E ¿ . In order for (38) to be satis…ed for both economies, we must have
Since F ¿ · F ¿ holds, inequality (44) implies F ¿ +1 < F ¿ +1 and ® ¿ +1 < ® ¿ +1 . Proceeding inductively as above, we show
contradicting lim t!1 F t = 1 and lim t!1 F t = 1. This establishes that R m > R m implies ® t > ® t holds for all t. To show that R d > R d implies ® t > ® t holds for all t, we repeat the same argument as above, since the inequalities (relating B t and B t , C t and C t , and so on) are unchanged. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equation (30) can be rewritten as follows:
We start with¸>¸, and …rst show that ® 1 > ® 1 holds. Suppose instead that we have
There is an analogous expression for g 2 (x 2 ; y 2 ; F ¡1 (y 1 )) with the subscripts reversed.
We will show that there is a stable manifold of the system converging to (1,1,1,1 ). Evaluated at (1,1,1,1 ), we can compute for i = 1,2,
and
Cross-derivatives are zero, so we must compute the eigenvalues of the matrix 0 B B B B B B B @ 0 1 0 0
yielding eigenvalues:
± . Since there are two real eigenvalues greater than 1 and two real eigenvalues less than 1, there is a stable manifold of dimension 2. From the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium, and the fact that (10) and (11) are equivalent to (4) and (5) when ® which has the eigenvalues,
1
Rm and 1 ± . Therefore, there is a one-dimensional stable manifold, given by the formula y = H(x). An argument along the lines given in the proof of Proposition 1 guarantees that the stable manifold remains between the 45 ± line and the x-axis, and must therefore cross the line, x = 1. To show uniqueness, we will show that the stable manifold is strictly monotonic. From the de…nitions of x, y, and H, we can rewrite (16) as
Implicit di¤erentiation of (56) yields
Suppose 0 < H 0 (H(x)) < 1 ± holds. Then the denominator of (57) exceeds G ¡1 (H(x))± ¡ x¡±H(x) G 0 (H(x)) . We know that H(x) < x and G 0 (®) < 0 hold, which implies that the denominator of (57) is positive and exceeds G ¡1 (H(x))±. Therefore, we have 0 < H 0 (x) < 
